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Abstract We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly
with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input
spillovers. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under
Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than
Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers
are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which
total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is
even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.
Keywords Bertrand competition · Cournot competition · Process R&D · Efficiency ·
Spillovers
JEL Classification L13
1 Introduction
It is well known that in a duopoly with an exogenous market structure price (Bertrand)
competition yields lower prices than quantity (Cournot) competition (Singh and
Vives 1984; Cheng 1985). With Bertrand competition residual demand is more
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sensitive to changes in price thereby yielding lower equilibrium prices (Martin 2002).
Zanchettin (2006) shows that this result extends to duopolies with exogenous cost
differences while for symmetric cost structures the result also extends to an oligopoly
(Vives 1985). Häckner (2000) reveals however that in an oligopoly of complementary
goods with exogenous quality differences the low-quality firms may charge higher
prices under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. The switch from
Cournot competition to Bertrand competition induces the high-quality firms to charge
a lower price. And the resulting upward pressure on the demand for the low-quality
complement then allows for a price increase. Hence (Häckner 2000, p. 238), “it is not
evident which type of competition is more efficient.”
If market structure is endogenous the traditional welfare comparison of Cournot
and Bertrand competition may indeed be reversed. Cellini et al. (2004) and Mukherjee
(2005) show that under free entry the number of firms entering under Cournot compe-
tition exceeds that under Bertrand competition. The resulting increase in the number
of product varieties can more than compensate for the higher price that always obtains
under Cournot competition.
Alternatively, the production function is endogenous in the sense that competition
in the product market is preceded by a stage where firms conduct research and develop-
ment (R&D). This research can be aimed at lowering production costs (Qiu 1997), or
at increasing product quality (Symeonidis 2003). Again the welfare comparison may
be reversed as under Cournot competition incentives to invest in R&D are higher than
under Bertrand competition.1 With process R&D, post-innovation production costs
under Cournot competition are then reduced more than under Bertrand competition.
This enhances the difference in profits under Cournot and Bertrand competition. As
a result, total surplus under Cournot competition can exceed total surplus under Ber-
trand competition, despite the fact that prices under Bertrand competition are always
lower than under Cournot competition (Qiu 1997). For product R&D similar results
apply although here the higher welfare under Cournot competition is due to higher
product quality which directly enhances consumers’ surplus (Symeonidis 2003).
In this paper we qualify the celebrated result of Singh and Vives (1984) by show-
ing that Cournot competition can yield lower prices than Bertrand competition in a
duopoly with endogenous production costs that supplies demand substitutes. To the
best of our knowledge we are the first to establish that lower prices can obtain under
Cournot competition with an exogenous market structure. It occurs when products
are relatively homogenous, when technological spillovers are strong, and when the
R&D production process is sufficiently efficient. Indeed, under these circumstances
the incentives to conduct R&D are much larger under Cournot competition than under
Bertrand competition as in this case much more of the benefits of any cost reduction
are given to consumers when competition is over price. As a result, post innovation
costs are much lower under Cournot competition which translates into a lower equi-
librium price. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition
exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger because profits under Bertrand
competition are always below those under Cournot competition.
1 If firms conduct both process R&D and product R&D the incentives comparison between competition
types is ambiguous (Lin and Saggi 2002).
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A motivating example for our analysis is the semiconductor industry. In this industry
firms compete à la Cournot and technological spillovers are strong (De Bondt and
Veugelers 1989). It is precisely in this industry that prices have fallen at an astonish-
ing rate of 36% per year in the 1990s. This pricing pattern can be attributed almost
exclusively to quality increases that are associated with product innovations (Aizcorbe
2006). Although the alternative pricing pattern under Bertrand competition is by def-
inition not available, this example does suggest that low prices can also emerge under
Cournot competition.
Our analysis is related to that of Qiu (1997). The main difference is that we consider
technological spillovers to occur during the R&D process while Qiu (1997), following
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), assumes that final R&D results spill over. That
is, we consider input spillovers rather than output spillovers. There are three important
reasons for doing so (see also Hinloopen 2003). First, empirical studies indicate that
spillovers occur during the R&D process (Kaiser 2002). This finding corresponds to
the three channels that Geroski (1995) identifies through which a technological spill-
over flows: (1) the exchange of ideas through publications, casual encounters and at
seminars, (2) the flow of knowledge when a knowledge worker changes employer, and
(3) the deduction of the line of reasoning of rivals by observing their behavior.
Second, Qiu (1997) assumes the R&D results of one firm to be additive (and pos-
sibly perfectly additive), to its rival’s R&D results. There are at least three reasons to
question this assumption. Note that the two firms operate in the same product market
while initially using the same production technology. It is then most likely that there
will be some overlap in their independently obtained research results that are aimed at
reducing the costs of production. Also, the parts that do not overlap are expected not to
be a perfect match to rivals’ research results. Finally, differences in corporate culture,
research strategies, and internal organization hamper any firm’s ability to appropriate
fully rival’s research results. In sum, high levels of technological output spillovers are
not likely to be observed.2
Third, Qiu (1997) assumes diminishing returns to scale in R&D. In combination
with additive output spillovers this has a counter-intuitive implication. If one firm has
spent more on R&D than its rival, it could be in the interest of the former to donate its
next R&D investment dollar to its rival and to appropriate the R&D results through
the technological spillover. If these spillovers are substantial this could be a more
effective additional cost reduction than spending this last R&D dollar on own R&D
(Amir 2000).
Recently, Amir et al. (2008) have formalized the latter flaw. They introduce the
intuitive criterion that investing in one research laboratory for a firm should be at
least as efficient as investing in several independent research laboratories that mutu-
ally benefit from spillovers. In particular (Amir et al. 2008): “ The R&D technology
and the spillover process should be such that any total R&D investment level can-
not generate more cost reduction if allocated to n labs, run independently but with
spillovers at their natural rate, than if spent all in one lab.” This means that any
research entity absorbs better its own findings than those acquired through spillovers
2 Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) take an extreme position here by assuming that all of any firm’s R&D
results are perfectly additive to any of its rivals’ R&D results.
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from other research entities. Indeed, the analysis of Qiu (1997) is at odds with this
criterion.
Output spillovers are more beneficial to a firm than input spillovers if there are
diminishing returns to scale in R&D. At the same time they reduce rivals’ production
cost more than what input spillovers would do. At forehand, the net effect of switching
from output spillovers to input spillovers on the incentives to invest in R&D is unclear.
And because R&D investments rule the efficiency comparison between Cournot and
Bertrand competition in Qiu (1997), it remains to be examined to what extent his anal-
ysis hinges on the assumption of output spillovers. For this reason we re-examine the
dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition assuming input spillovers.
In passing we reveal a technical error in Qiu (1997) related to the stability of equilibria
when R&D is a strategic substitute.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the model is introduced and
the technical difference between input and output spillovers is discussed in detail.
In Sect. 3 the equilibria are characterized under second-stage Cournot and Bertrand
competition. The two competition types are compared next and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage firms invest in cost-reducing R&D. In
the second stage they compete either over price or quantity. Market demand in indirect
form is given by:3
pi = a −
(
qi + θq j
)
, (1)
i, j = 1, 2, i = j , where pi and qi are the respective price and quantity of product
i , and where θ captures the extent to which products are differentiated; in case θ = 1
products are homogeneous while θ = 0 corresponds to completely differentiated prod-
ucts (i.e. both firms have a local monopoly). These polar cases are further ignored,
that is, θ ∈ (0, 1). Unless stated otherwise, i, j = 1, 2, i = j holds throughout the
rest of the paper. Market demand in direct form is then given by:
qi = 11 − θ2
[
(1 − θ)a − (pi − θp j
)]
. (2)
The industry consists of two firms each producing one version of the differentiated
product. Ex ante marginal costs of production, c, are fixed. We assume that both firms
are active, that is, c < a.
2.1 Input spillovers versus output spillovers
Fixed production costs can be reduced by investing in process-innovating R&D. Note
that if one firm conducts R&D, the rival firm can absorb part of this effort without
3 This follows from a standard quadratic utility function, see Singh and Vives (1984).
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having to pay for it.4 This process runs through the technological spillover. In
modelling this externality we adhere to the criterion identified by Amir et al. (2008),
which states that it should be more beneficial to a firm to invest in one research labo-
ratory than to invest in several independent research laboratories that possibly benefit
from mutual spillovers.
Qiu (1997) considers the final results of any firm’s R&D efforts to spill over to its
rival. There are diminishing returns to R&D in that any reduction in production costs
x comes at a cost f (x), with f ′ > 0, f ′′ ≥ 0 and f (0) = 0. If β ∈ [0, 1] represents
the technological spillover, firm i realizes a cost reduction of xi + βx j if it invests
f (xi ) in R&D. The criterion of Amir et al. (2008) then requires:
f (xi + βx j ) ≤ f (xi ) + f (x j ). (3)
For any f with f (0) = 0 Amir et al. (2008, Proposition 2) show that condition (3)
translates into β f ′(x) ≤ f ′(0). This condition is violated for the formulation used
by Qiu (1997), being f (z) = γ z2/2. Put differently, in Qiu (1997) it is beneficial
to spread any R&D investment over a number of different independent research labs
rather than investing it in one laboratory. In case of two firms a counter-intuitive result
then obtains. Rather than investing its next R&D euro itself, it could be in the interest
of a firm to give this euro to its rival for her to invest in R&D, and to appropriate the
result through the output spillover.
In case of input spillovers the reduction in marginal cost brought about by an R&D
investment is determined by an R&D production function g. Diminishing returns to
R&D obtain if g′ > 0, g′′ < 0, and g(0) = 0. If firm i invests in R&D, its effective
R&D investments Xi due to the input spillover are given by:
Xi = xi + βx j . (4)
Investing xi thus yields a reduction in cost of g(Xi ). The criterion of Amir et al. (2008)
then requires:
g(Xi ) ≤ g(xi ) + g(x j ), (5)
which holds for any g with diminishing returns. Following Amir (2000) we set:
g(Xi ) =
√
Xi
/
γ , (6)
whereby γ > 0 determines the efficiency of the R&D phase. A higher value of γ
corresponds to a less efficient production of R&D results. Note that R&D production
function (6) fulfills criterion ( 5).
4 It is understood that firms have to conduct at least some R&D themselves to appropriate rival’s R&D
results (for an early recognition of this point see Cohen and Levinthal 1989). We abstain from modelling
this absorptive capacity as it would make the analysis intractable (cfr. Kamien and Zang 2000).
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Firm i’s profits then equal
πi = pi qi − (c − yi ) qi − xi , (7)
with yi =
√
(xi + βx j )/γ .
3 Market equilibria
3.1 Second-stage Bertrand competition
Maximizing (7) over price yields equilibrium prices conditional on effective R&D
efforts:5
p̂i (Xi , X j ) − c = (a − c)(2 + θ)(1 − θ) − 2yi − θy j4 − θ2 . (8)
Inserting (8) into (7) and maximizing the resulting profits over R&D investments result
in the following cost reduction:6,7
y˜ B = (a − c)
(
2 − θ2 − θβ)
γ (1 + θ)(2 − θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θ2 − θβ) , (9)
and concomitant total output:
Q˜ B = 2γ (a − c)(4 − θ
2)
γ (1 + θ)(2 − θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θ2 − θβ) . (10)
Single-firm equilibrium profits then equal:
π˜ B = γ (1 + β)(1 − θ
2)(4 − θ2)2 − (2 − θ2 − θβ)2
γ (1 + β)(4 − θ2)2
(
q˜ B
)2
, (11)
where q˜ B = Q˜ B/2. In equilibrium, consumers’ surplus and total surplus respectively
are given by:
C˜ SB = (1 + θ)
(
q˜ B
)2
, (12)
and
T˜ SB = γ (1 + β)(1 + θ)(4 − θ
2)2(3 − 2θ) − 2(2 − θ2 − θβ)2
γ (1 + β)(4 − θ2)2
(
q˜ B
)2
. (13)
5 A hat refers to a conditional equilibrium outcome.
6 A tilde refers to an unconditional equilibrium expression; superscript B stands for second-stage Bertrand
competition.
7 The concomitant second-order and stability conditions are dealt with below.
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3.2 Second-stage Cournot competition
Maximizing (7) over quantities gives us:
q̂i (Xi , X j ) = (a − c)(2 − θ) + 2yi − θy j4 − θ2 . (14)
Maximizing firm profits over R&D investments after inserting (14) into (7) yields as
cost reduction and concomitant total output level: 8
y˜C = (a − c)(2 − θβ)
γ (2 + θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θβ) , (15)
and
Q˜C = 2γ (a − c)(4 − θ
2)
γ (2 + θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θβ) . (16)
Single-firm profits are given by:
π˜C = γ (1 + β)(4 − θ
2)2 − (2 − θβ)2
γ (1 + β)(4 − θ2)2
(
q˜C
)2
, (17)
with q˜C = Q˜C/2. Consumers’ surplus and total welfare under second-stage Cournot
competition then equal:
C˜ SC = (1 + θ)
(
q˜C
)2
, (18)
and
T˜ SC = γ (1 + β)(3 + θ)(4 − θ
2)2 − 2(2 − θβ)2
γ (1 + β)(4 − θ2)2
(
q˜C
)2
. (19)
3.3 Regularity conditions
The R&D stage gives rise to eight regularity conditions. In addition to the two sec-
ond-order conditions, post-innovation costs have to be positive and the equilibrium
has to be stable. The second-order conditions under Bertrand and Cournot competition
require, respectively:
γ ≥
(
2 − θ2 − θβ)3
(1 − θ2)(4 − θ2)2(2 − θ2 − θβ2) , (R1)
8 Superscript C stands for second-stage Cournot competition.
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and
γ ≥ (2 − θβ)
3
(2 − θβ2)(4 − θ2)2 . (R2)
Under Bertrand and Cournot competition positive post-innovation costs respec-
tively imply:
γ >
a(2 − θ2 − θβ)
c(2 − θ)(1 + θ)(4 − θ2) , (R3)
and
γ >
a(2 − θβ)
c(2 + θ)(4 − θ2) . (R4)
Finally, the Routh-Hurwitz stability condition is that:
∂2π̂i (xi , x j )
∂x2i
∂2π̂ j (xi , x j )
∂x2j
− ∂
2π̂i (xi , x j )
∂x j∂xi
∂2π̂ j (xi , x j )
∂xi∂x j
> 0. (20)
This condition depends on the strategic nature of the R&D process. Following
Bulow et al. (1985), label decision variable x a strategic substitute in case
∂2π̂i (xi , x j )/∂xi∂x j < 0, and a strategic complement if ∂2π̂i (xi , x j )/∂xi∂x j > 0.
Accordingly, in a symmetric equilibrium condition (20) boils down to:
∂2πi (xi , x j )
∂x2i
<
∂2πi (xi , x j )
∂xi∂x j
, (21)
for strategic substitutes. For strategic complements it reads as:
∂2πi (xi , x j )
∂x2i
< −∂
2πi (xi , x j )
∂xi∂x j
. (22)
Under Bertrand competition these two stability conditions respectively translate into:
γ >
(2 − θ2 − θβ)2
(4 − θ2)(2 + θ)(1 − θ)(2 − θ2 + θβ) , (R5)
and
γ >
(2 − θ2 − θβ)
(4 − θ2)(2 − θ)(1 + θ) . (R6)
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In case of Cournot competition the two stability conditions are:
γ >
(2 − θβ)2
(4 − θ2)(2 − θ)(2 + θβ) , (R7)
and
γ >
(2 − θβ)
(4 − θ2)(2 + θ) . (R8)
Five of these regularity conditions are redundant as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 1 The parameter space is bounded by regularity conditions R4, R5 and R7.
Proof It is immediate that R4 dominates R3, that R5 dominates R6, and that R7
dominates R8. Also, R5 dominates R1 and R7 dominates R2. unionsq
Note that Qiu (1997) considers stability conditions only in case R&D is a strategic
complement. In his model the stability conditions for R&D as a strategic substitute
under Cournot and Bertrand competition are respectively given by (using the notation
in Qiu 1997):
v >
2(2 − θγ )(1 − θ)
(2 − γ )(4 − γ 2) , (23)
and
v >
2(1 − θ)(2 − θγ − γ 2)
(1 − γ )(2 + γ )(4 − γ 2) , (24)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the output spillover, where v is the measure of the efficiency of
the R&D process, and where γ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the extent of product differentiation.
The analysis of Qiu (1997) applies only to R&D that is a strategic complement as it
is straightforward to show that conditions (23) and (24) can be more restrictive than
the stability conditions when R&D is a strategic complement.
4 Cournot versus Bertrand
4.1 R&D investments
Comparing the effective R&D efforts of the different competition modes leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1], y˜C > y˜ B under R4, R5 and
R7.
Proof y˜C > y˜ B ⇔ (1 + θ)(2 − θ)(2 − θβ) > (2 + θ)(2 − θ2 − θβ), or β > −1. unionsq
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According to Proposition 1, R&D activity is higher under Cournot competition
than under Bertrand competition. This result replicates Qiu (1997, Proposition 1).9
He decomposes the incentives to invest in R&D into four different effects: a strategic
effect, a spillover effect, a size effect and a cost effect. These effects are obtained by
totally differentiating the first-order conditions ∂πi/∂qi ≡ 0 (under Cournot compe-
tition) and ∂πi/∂pi ≡ 0 (under Bertrand competition) with respect to xi . This yields,
respectively (Qiu 1997, p. 225, using his notation):
∂πCi
∂xi
=
strategic effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
C
∂πi
∂q j
∂2π j
∂qi∂q j
+
spillover effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
− θ
C
∂πi
∂q j
∂2πi
∂q2i
+
size effect (+)
︷︸︸︷
qi +
cost effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷−vxi ≡ 0, (25)
where C = (∂2πi/∂q2i
) (
∂2π j/∂q2j
)
− (∂2πi/∂q j∂qi
) (
∂2π j/∂qi q j
)
> 0, and
∂π B
∂xi
=
strategic effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
B
∂qi
∂pi
∂πi
∂p j
∂2π j
∂pi∂p j
+
spillover effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
− θ
B
∂q j
∂p j
∂πi
∂p j
∂2πi
∂p2i
+
size effect (+)
︷︸︸︷
qi +
cost effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷−vxi ≡ 0, (26)
where B = (∂2πi/∂p2i )(∂2π j/∂p2j )− (∂2πi/∂p j∂pi )(∂2π j/∂pi p j ) > 0. The spill-
over, size and cost effect have an identical sign under Cournot and Bertrand competi-
tion. The spillover effect and the cost effect are negative. The more expensive is R&D,
the lower will be the R&D investment. And the free flow of knowledge to competitors
obviously reduces the incentive to invest in R&D. The size effect is positive and refers
to the quantities produced. The more a firm produces, the more profitable will be a
reduction in production costs, the higher is the incentive to invest in R&D that creates
such a cost reduction.
The strategic effect however carries an opposite sign. With Cournot competition it is
positive as quantities are strategic substitutes. It thus pays to have lower marginal cost
as that translates into a larger market share and higher profits. With Bertrand competi-
tion it is negative as prices are strategic complements. Reduced marginal costs induce
a firm to cut price. Rivals’ reaction will be to lower its price as well. In the end this
reduces both firms’ profits.
The switch from output spillovers to input spillovers yields under Cournot and
Bertrand competition respectively the following two decompositions:
∂πCi
∂xi
=
strategic effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
C
∂πi
∂q j
∂2π j
∂qi∂q j
+
spillover effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
− βyi
y jC
∂πi
∂q j
∂2πi
∂q2i
+
size effect (+)
︷︸︸︷
qi +
cost effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
−2γ yi ≡ 0, (27)
9 The ranking in Proposition 1 is also found by Breton et al. (2004) who replicate the analysis of Qiu (1997)
within an infinite horizon setting.
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and
∂π B
∂xi
=
strategic effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
B
∂qi
∂pi
∂πi
∂p j
∂2π j
∂pi∂p j
+
spillover effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
− βyi
y jB
∂q j
∂p j
∂πi
∂p j
∂2πi
∂p2i
+
size effect (+)
︷︸︸︷
qi +
cost effect (−)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
−2γ yi ≡0. (28)
Comparing (25) with (27) and (26) with (28) shows that in a symmetric equilibrium
the difference between the two models as to the R&D investment incentives is ruled
by the difference in the cost effect. As this effect is of larger magnitude with input
spillovers, in equilibrium the R&D investments with output spillovers will exceed
those with input spillovers.10 That is, with input spillovers the R&D intensity is lower
than with output spillovers under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. As Amir
(2000, p. 1029) notes: “At a quantitative level, the d’Aspremont–Jacquemin model
has a systematic bias towards higher levels of R&D than the Kamien–Muller–Zang
model”.
The actual difference in R&D activity that leads to the ranking in Proposition 1 is
closely related to the efficiency of the R&D process. That is:
Lemma 2 Under R4, R5 and R7, the difference in R&D activity under Cournot and
Bertrand competition is larger the more efficient is the R&D process.
Proof Note that
y˜C − y˜ B
= γ θ
3(4 − θ2)(1 + β)(a − c)
[γ (2 + θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θβ)][γ (1 + θ)(2 − θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θ2 − θβ)] .
Then observe that:
∂
(
y˜C − y˜ B)
∂γ
< 0 ⇔ γ 2 > (2 − θβ)(2 − θ
2 − θβ)
(1 + θ)(4 − θ2)3 .
This last condition is less restrictive than condition R7 if, and only if (2 − θβ)3(1 +
θ)(4−θ2)−(2−θ2−θβ)(2−θ)2(2+θβ)2 > 0. Considering the left-hand side (LHS) of
this last inequality, the result then follows as min{θ,β}L H S = limθ→0 L H S|β=1 = 0.
unionsq
The larger is the reduction in production costs for any level of R&D investment,
the more prominent is the strategic effect that affects any firms’ incentive to conduct
R&D. Hence, the more efficient is the R&D process, the larger is the difference in
R&D investments under Cournot competition vis-à-vis Bertrand competition.
10 It is left to the reader to check this specifically through comparison of the equilibrium expressions for
R&D investments with input and output spillovers.
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4.2 Profits
Under Cournot competition firms invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competi-
tion (Proposition 1). And larger R&D investments reduce profits, all else equal. The
following proposition shows however that these higher R&D costs under Cournot
competition are more than offset by the concomitant reduction in production cost:
Proposition 2 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1], π˜C > π˜ B under R4, R5
and R7.
Proof First note that π˜C − π˜ B = γ (a − c)2(A − B)/(1 + β), where
A = γ (1 + β)(4 − θ
2)2 − (2 − θβ)2
[
γ (2 + θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θβ)]2
,
and
B = γ (1 + β)(1 − θ
2)(4 − θ2)2 − (2 − θ2 − θβ)2
[
γ (1 + θ)(2 − θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θ2 − θβ)]2
.
Then observe that:
π˜C − π˜ B > 0 ⇔ γ > 2(4 − 3θ
2) − θ(1 − β)(θ2 − 2θ − 4)
2(1 + θ)(4 − θ2)2 .
This last condition is less restrictive than condition R7 if, and only if, (1 − β)[
32 + 16θ − 12θ2 − 16θβ − 2θ3(1 + β) + 8θ3β] + θ2β [8β − θ2(1 + β)] > 0.
Considering the LHS of this last inequality the result then follows as min{θ,β}L H S =
limθ→0 L H S|β=1 = 0. unionsq
Proposition 2 states that producers’ surplus under Cournot competition is always
larger than under Bertrand competition. Because post-innovation production costs are
lower under Cournot competition, this larger producers’ surplus can exceed the lower
consumers’ surplus in Cournot markets compared to Bertrand markets. But before we
analyze total surplus we first consider consumers’ surplus.
4.3 Price
For comparing prices under Cournot and Bertrand competition we introduce the fol-
lowing assumption:
γ <
1
4 − θ2 (A1)
If assumption A1 holds the R&D process is labelled ‘efficient’. According to
Lemma 2 this corresponds to situations where post-innovation cost under Cournot
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Fig. 1 Comparing consumers’ surplus with Cournot and Bertrand competition under assumption A1 and
regularity conditions R4 and R5 (a = 100, c = 70, γ = 725 )
competition are particularly low compared to post-innovation costs under
Bertrand competition. As will be shown below, this allows the equilibrium price under
Cournot competition to be lower than under Bertrand competition. First note that
assumption A1 does not rule out the existence of equilibria:
Lemma 3 The set where regularity conditions R4, R5, R7 and assumption A1 hold
is not empty.
Proof For A1 and R4 to hold jointly it must be that 1 < a/c < (2 + θ)/(2 − θβ), or
2(a − c) < θ(aβ + c). Indeed, a and c can always be chosen such that this inequality
holds. For A1 and R5 to hold jointly it must be that 1 > (2−θ2−θβ)2/(2+θ)(1−θ)(2−
θ2+θβ), orβ >
(
6 − 3θ2 − θ − √(1 − θ)(36 + 16θ − 19θ2 − 9θ3)
)/
2θ = f (θ).
Note that f (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ ∈ (0, 1), that limθ→0 f (θ) =
1
3 , and that limθ→1 f (θ) = 1. For A1 and R7 to hold jointly it must be that 1 >
(2 − θβ)2/ (2− θ)(2+ θβ), or β > (6 − θ − √(18 − θ)(2 − θ))/ 2θ = g(θ). Note
that g(θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ ∈ (0, 1), that limθ→0g(θ) = 13 ,
and that limθ→1g(θ) = (5 −
√
17)/2 ≈ 0.438. unionsq
Figure 1 displays the admissible parameter space and assumption A1 for particular
values of a, c, and γ . From the proof of Lemma 3 follows that f (θ) − g(θ) > 0
∀θ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, under assumption A1 the admissible parameter space is confined
by conditions R4 and R5.
We can now state the main result of our analysis.
Proposition 3 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1], p˜C < p˜B under R4, R5, R7,
and A1.
Proof Lower prices obtain under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competi-
tion if, and only if, Q˜C > Q˜ B , or γ < 1/(4 − θ2). unionsq
Proposition 3 conveys our new message. In a duopoly with substitutable products,
prices can be lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. This
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happens when post-innovation costs under Cournot competition are sufficiently below
post-innovation costs under Bertrand competition. Considering the admissible param-
eter space in Lemma 3, this occurs when the R&D process is efficient, when spillovers
are substantial, and when products are not too differentiated. It is precisely under
these circumstances that the benefits of any cost reduction are transferred much more
to consumers under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Hence,
production costs under Cournot competition are much lower than under Bertrand
competition which allows the equilibrium price to be lower as well.11
4.4 Welfare
As producers’ surplus is always higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand
competition (Proposition 2), the result in Proposition 3 carries over to total surplus:
Proposition 4 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ [0, 1], T˜ SC > T˜ SB under R4, R5,
R7, and A1.
For a less efficient R&D production process it is still possible that total surplus
under Cournot competition exceeds total surplus under Bertrand competition. In that
case consumers’ surplus is lower when firms compete over quantities (Proposition 3).
But this lower consumers’ surplus is then more than compensated for by the higher
producers’ surplus under Cournot competition. To establish this result it is convenient
to distinguish two cases: (1) no input spillovers, and (2) positive input spillovers.
Proposition 5 For any given θ ∈ (0, 1) and β = 0, T˜ SC < T˜ SB under R4, R5, R7,
and ¬A1.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Absent input spillovers the traditional welfare comparison emerges provided that
the R&D production process is not too efficient. For positive input spillovers the differ-
ence in R&D investment incentives under Cournot and Bertrand competition becomes
more pronounced. Indeed, a threshold value of the input spillover exists beyond which
total surplus is larger if firms compete over quantity rather than over price:
Proposition 6 Suppose that β ∈ (0, 1], and that R4, R5, R7 and ¬A1 hold. Then,
given θ ∈ (0, 1), ∃ γ (θ) such that
(i) if γ > γ (θ), then T˜ SB − T˜ SC > 0 ∀β ∈ (0, 1]; and
11 The result in Proposition 3 does not hinge on spillovers to be input spillovers. In Qiu (1997) the parameter
space is bounded by five conditions (realizing that R&D can also be a strategic substitute and using the
notation in Qiu 1997; see Sect. 3.3): v > 2(2 − θγ )2/(4 − γ 2)2, v > 2(2 − θγ )(1 + θ)/(2 + γ )(4 − γ 2),
v > 2a(1 + θ)(2 − θγ )/c(2 + γ )(4 − γ 2), v > 2(2 − θγ − γ 2)2/(1 − γ 2)(4 − γ 2)2, and v >
2(1 − θ)(2 − θγ − γ 2)/(1 − γ )(2 + γ )(4 − γ 2). The condition corresponding to assumption A1 is that
v < 2(1 + θ)/(4 − γ 2). For instance, the combination of parameter values a = 100, c = 70, θ = 0.95
and γ = 0.95 lies within the admissible parameter space and it fulfills the additional assumption. The
equilibrium price under Cournot competition is then 65.4 while under Bertrand competition it is 67.9.
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(ii) if γ < γ (θ), then ∃ β(θ) ∈ (0, 1] such that
T˜ SB − T˜ SC
⎧
⎨
⎩
> 0 ∀β < β(θ)
= 0 if β = β(θ)
< 0 ∀β > β(θ).
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Technological spillovers carry a positive externality that raises total surplus. The
combination of large R&D investments and strong technological spillovers contributes
in particular to total surplus. Hence, as under Cournot competition R&D investments
exceed those under Bertrand competition, total surplus can be larger under quantity
competition when the input spillover is strong enough.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process
R&D, price can be lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition.
This occurs when the R&D process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and
when products are not too differentiated. Under these circumstances much more of
the benefit of any cost reduction are given to consumers under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot competition. As a result the post-innovation costs are much lower
under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition leading to lower prices
when firms compete over quantities.
The robustness of our result should be checked along several dimensions. An obvi-
ous scenario would be to consider cooperative R&D prior to the production stage.
Allowing firms to cooperate in R&D is an important policy tool to enhance incentives
towards investment in R&D. As this policy is driven foremost by the resulting inter-
nalization of the technological spillover, it needs to be examined whether it affects the
conclusion that price can be lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand
competition.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 5
First note that:
T˜ SB − T˜ SC = γ (a − c)
2
2B
2
C
F(γ ; θ),
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Fig. 2 G(γ ;β, θ) for different levels of R&D input spillovers; a = 100, c = 70, θ = 0.9
where B = γ (1 + θ)(2 − θ)(4 − θ2) − (2 − θ2), C = γ (2 + θ)
(4 − θ2) − 2, and F(γ, θ) = [γ (4 − θ2)2(1 + θ)(3 − 2θ) − 2(2 − θ2)2]2C −[
γ (4 − θ2)2 (3 + θ) − 8]2B . Define G(γ ; θ)= F(γ ; θ)/
(
γ θ2(4 − θ2)). Obviously,
sign
(
T˜ SB − T˜ SC
)
= sign(G(γ ; θ)). Note that G(γ ; θ) = γ 2g1 +γ g2 +g3, where
g1 = (4 − θ2)3(1+ θ)(4 − 2θ − θ2), g2 = −2(4 − θ2)2(1+ θ)(4 − θ − θ2)+ 2θ(4 −
θ2)(8 + 4θ − 4θ2 − θ3), and g3 = (4 − θ2)(4 + 4θ − 3θ2 − θ3) − 8θ(2 − θ2). It
follows that G(γ ; θ) is strictly convex in γ as ∂2G(γ ; θ)/∂γ 2 = 2g1 > 0 (indeed:
min{θ}g1 = limθ→1 g1 = 54). Moreover, g22 − 4g1g3 > 0 ∀ θ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, given
any θ ∈ (0, 1), there are two real solutions to G(γ ; θ) = 0, in particular:
γ 1(θ) =
−g2 −
√
g22 − 4g1g3
2g1
, and γ 2(θ) =
−g2 +
√
g22 − 4g1g3
2g1
.
When β = 0, regularity condition R5 is most binding. Label the resulting threshold
value on the efficiency parameter γ ∗. The result then follows as minθ {γ ∗ − γ 2(θ)} =
limθ→0{γ ∗ − γ 2(θ)} = 0 (see also Fig. 2).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6
This proofs is a general version of that in Section “Proof of Proposition 5”. Observe
that:
T˜ SB − T˜ SC = γ (a − c)
2
(1 + β)2B2C
F(γ ;β, θ),
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where B = γ (1+θ)(2−θ)(4−θ2)−(2−θ2−θβ), C = γ (2+θ)(4−θ2)−(2−θβ),
and F(γ, β, θ) = [γ (1 + β)(4 − θ2)2(1 + θ)(3 − 2θ) − 2(2 − θ2 − θβ)2]2C −[
γ (1 + β)(4 − θ2)2(3 + θ) − 2(2 − θβ)2]2B . Again we consider the related func-
tion G(γ ;β, θ) = F(γ ;β, θ)/ (γ θ2(4 − θ2)). It follows that sign
(
T˜ SB − T˜ SC
)
=
sign(G(γ ;β, θ)). Note that G(γ ;β, θ) = γ 2g1 + γ g2 + g3, where g1 = (1 + β)
(4−θ2)3(1+θ)(4−2θ −θ2), g2 = −2(1+β)(4−θ2)2(1+θ)(4−θ2 −θ(1−β))−
2(4 − θ2) [(4 + 2θ − θ2)(2 − θβ)2 − (2 + θ)2(4 − 2θβ − θ2)], and g3 = (1 + β)
(4 − θ2) [2(2 − θβ)(1 + θ + θβ) − (3 + θ)θ2] − 4θ(1 + β)(2 − θβ)(2 − θ2 − θβ).
Then note that G(γ ;β, θ) is strictly convex in γ as ∂2G(γ ;β, θ)/∂γ 2 = 2g1 > 0
(indeed: min{θ,β}g1 = limθ→1,β→0 g1 = 54). Moreover, g22 −4g1g3 > 0∀ θ ∈ (0, 1).
Hence, given any θ ∈ (0, 1), there are two real solutions to G(γ ;β, θ) = 0, in
particular:
γ 1(θ) =
−g2 −
√
g22 − 4g1g3
2g1
, and γ 2(θ) =
−g2 +
√
g22 − 4g1g3
2g1
.
Only the larger root needs to be considered as minθ,β{γ ∗ − γ 1(θ)} = limθ→0 {γ ∗−
γ 2(θ)
} |β=1 = 0 , where γ ∗ is the threshold value induced by R7. Label the larger
root γ (θ). Then observe that minθ,β {∂γ (θ)/∂β} = limθ→0 ∂γ (θ)/∂β|β=0.5 = 0.
This gives rise to the different lines as drawn in Fig. 2 for different values of β. Obvi-
ously, for any γ > γ (θ) we are in situation (1) while situation (2) emerges for any
γ > γ (θ). The rest of the proof then follows.
References
Aizcorbe AM (2006) Why are semiconductor price indexes fall so fast in the 1990s? A decomposition.
Econ Inq 44:485–496
Amir R (2000) Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers. Int J Ind Organ 18:1013–1032
Amir R, Jim JY, Troege M (2008) On additive spillovers and returns to scale in R&D. Int J Ind Organ
26:695–703
Breton M, Turki A, Zaccour G (2004) Dynamic model of R&D spillovers, and efficiency of Bertrand and
Cournot equilibria. J Optim Theory Appl 123:1–25
Bulow J, Geanakoplos J, Klemperer P (1985) Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and complements.
J Political Econ 93:488–511
Cellini R, Lambertini L, Ottaviano GIP (2004) Welfare in a differentiated oligopoly with free entry:
a cautionary note. Res Econ 58:125–133
Cheng (1985) Comparing Bertrand and Cournot equilibria: a geometric approach. RAND J Econ 16:146–
152
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA (1989) Innovation and learning: the two faces of R&D. Econ J 99:569–596
d’Aspremont C, Jacquemin A (1988) Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers.
Am Econ Rev 78:1133–1137
De Bondt R, Veugelers R (1989) Informatie en kennis in de economie. In: de Bondt R, Veugelers R (eds)
Referatenboek (23ste VWEC). Leuven Universitaire Pers, Leuven, pp 19–33
Geroski PA (1995) Do spillovers undermine the incentive to innovate? In: Dowrick S (ed) Economic
approaches to innovation. Edward Elgar, Alderschot, pp 76–97
Gersbach H, Schmutzler A (2003) Endogenous spillovers and incentives to innovate. Econ Theory 21:59–79
Häckner J (2000) A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies. J Econ Theory
93:233–239
Hinloopen J (2003) R&D efficiency gains due to cooperation. J Econ 80:107–125
123
136 J. Hinloopen, J. Vandekerckhove
Kaiser U (2002) Measuring knowledge spillovers in manufacturing and services: an empirical assessment
of alternative approaches. Res Policy 31:125–144
Kamien M, Zang I (2000) Meet me halfway: research joint ventures and absorptive capacity. Int J Ind Organ
18:995–1013
Lin P, Saggi K (2002) Product differentiation, process R&D and the nature of market competition. Eur
Econ Rev 46:201–211
Martin S (2002) Advanced industrial economics. Blackwell, Oxford
Mukherjee A (2005) Price and quantity competition under free entry. Res Econ 59:335–344
Qiu LD (1997) On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. J Econ Theory 75:213–229
Singh N, Vives X (1984) Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. RAND J Econ 15:546–
554
Symeonidis G (2003) Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product
R&D. Int J Ind Organ 21:39–56
Vives X (1985) On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation. J Econ
Theory 36:166–175
Zanchettin P (2006) Differentiated duopoly with asymmetric costs. J Econ Manag Strategy 15:999–1015
123
